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I.

Introduction

This paper is designed to explore the premise that less developed countries are less sophisticated
negotiators and overly susceptible to the pressures of vast economic powers like the United
States or the European Union (EU).1 To test the viability of this premise, this paper uses a case
study comparing a less developed country’s negotiations with such an economic power and a
developed country’s negotiations with the same economic power by comparing Chile and
Australia’s recently successful completion of bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations
with the United States. This case study will evaluate the historical and socio-economic
conditions in both countries and how they may have impacted the respective countries’
negotiations. In so doing, the results may show that less developed countries are not nearly as
unsophisticated as commentators make them out to be.
Additionally, such a case study may provide insights into other theories. Specifically, it may
indicate whether multilateral or bilateral treaty negotiations are the more equitable forum for
negotiating the metes and bounds of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Related to this
determination is the question of whether Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) should be
involved in IPR related negotiations between less developed countries and developed countries
in an attempt to make such negotiations more equitable.2
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Recently, the United States of America has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Chile and
Australia that will greatly impact the intellectual property regimes of both Australia and Chile.
For example, Chile and Australia are both required to essentially pass a form of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright and Performances and Phonograms
Treaties and provide greater rights to other intellectual property, like trademarks.3 While the U.S.
implementation of these treaties resulted in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), it
may not be necessary for these countries to create such stringent laws to meet the terms of these
treaties.4 However, prior to the execution of these FTAs, these countries were unwilling to
implement the WIPO treaties because of their concerns with enacting intellectual property laws
that could be detrimental to their citizens’ well being.5
The expansion of IPRs through multilateral or bilateral treaties is a substantial concern for many
commentators and activists who feel intellectual property rights have expanded to the detriment
of “less sophisticated” signatories of such treaties.6 However, recent developments have shown
that less developed countries are not necessarily as unsophisticated as originally thought.7
The results of this case study and how they relate to these topics are discussed more fully below.
Section II of this paper provides background on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, the
bureaucratic systems created by such agreements, and the implications these systems have on
intellectual property rights and intellectual property law development. Sections III and IV are a
case study of Chile and Australia that provide historical, socio-economic, and political
background for both countries. Moreover, each section explores the negotiation process used in
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making a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Section V evaluates the findings of this case study,
exploring the similarities and differences found in each country’s negotiation strategy, and
rationale behind accepting the terms of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Further, it explores
the implications this case study may have on various theories commentators have developed in
connection with intellectual property law evolution and free trade agreements.
II. International Intellectual Property Agreements, & Resulting Bureaucratic Structure
Countries that are net exporters of technology and copyright products created a new strategy to
expand the scope of IPRs attributable to these products.8 The lead exporter of technology and
copyright products, the United States, started to implement this strategy in the mid 1990’s.9 The
strategy revolved around three sometimes overlapping concepts, the first being the creation of
effective dispute settlement for substantive intellectual property rights, the second being the
expansion of the definition of investment to include intellectual property rights, and the third
being the non-violation complaint alleging nullification or impairment of benefits.10
In 1994, this strategy was implemented successfully when the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect.11 It was later expanded to all the members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, when the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into force and required all WTO members to provide
minimum standards of intellectual property protection.12 Since these two agreements were
signed, various bilateral and other multilateral agreements and negotiations have taken place
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attempting to broaden the reach and enforcement of intellectual property rights to various other
countries.13
A. TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement expanded and universalized the minimum levels of intellectual property
protection for industrialized countries only after reaching a certain level of development.14 The
agreed upon scope of protection for IPRs limited the options for developing countries in the
design of their intellectual property systems.15 However, the TRIPS Agreement still allowed
countries to adopt different strategies and definitions that could affect the scope and
enforceability of these rights.16 This flexibility is critical for countries to be able to use their
intellectual property legislation as a means of achieving a set of economic development, social
development, and environmental protection objectives.17
To ease the economic and legislative burdens these new standards created, implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement provisions was not universally required to occur simultaneously. Developed
countries like Canada or the United States had to apply all TRIPS provisions by January 1,
1996.18 However, developing-country WTO Members did not have to apply most TRIPS
provisions until January 1, 2000.19 In 2000, developing countries yet to extend product-patent
protection to all technology areas, could further delay the domestic application of these
protections to any area not covered (e.g., pharmaceuticals) until 2005.20 A least-developed
country WTO member could delay the implementation of most TRIPS provisions until the start
of 2006, at which time it could further extend this transitional period by successfully persuading
the TRIPS Council to exclude its transition period.21
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However, the flexibility TRIPS allegedly provides has been called into question by
commentators.22 Specifically, the TRIPS Agreement use of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding has limited member state’s policy choices due to the mandatory supranational
adjudication that may be incurred by another member state’s complaint.23 These adjudications
have resulted in the disallowance of various member states’ attempts to implement various
aspects of TRIPS while still maintaining some domestic favoritisms or prejudices that were
arguably within the scope of the Agreement’s terms.24
Some commentators believe that multilateral negotiations are a more favorable forum for less
developed countries.25 In contrast, other observers believe that, at least in the instance of TRIPS,
less developed countries negotiated away even more rights and flexibility than they would have
in a bilateral setting with a superior power.26 Thus, there is some dispute over which negotiating
forum, bilateral or multilateral, is the more equitable forum. It is quite possible that, contrary to
U.S. coercion theorists’ claims, less developed countries may be wiser to use bilateral and
regional multilateral agreements to negotiate with a larger, more developed country.27
B. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Since the signing of TRIPS, the most active international intellectual property law forum has
been bilateral agreements.28 Generally, these agreements are between a developed country, like
22
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the United States, and a less developed country, like Chile.29 Most commentators believe that the
less developed countries agree to provide stronger IPRs, or TRIPS-plus, protections in exchange
for greater access to the developed country’s markets and investors.30 These TRIPS-plus
provisions define various IPRs or expand the scope or standard of an IPR beyond the minimal
TRIPS standard, reducing the flexibility provided in the TRIPS Agreement.31 This same model is
used for multilateral negotiations like the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),
the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), or the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).32
Recently, the United States has been extremely prolific in its bilateral negotiations, reaching
agreements with Singapore, Morocco, Chile, Australia, El Salvador, Jordan, and eight other
countries.33 It has also negotiated extensively with other Latin American and Caribbean countries
on the FTAA. 34 Moreover, the U.S. is working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013
and is also in bilateral negotiations with five countries within the Southern African Customs
Union.35
Obviously, the United States, as the largest exporter of intellectual property driven goods, seeks
to expand IPRs’ scope and enforcement.36 Moreover, because the U.S. represents about one fifth
of the world economy, it has the most to offer less developed countries in terms of market access
and investment opportunity.37 Thus, it should not be very surprising that the U.S. has been so
active and successful in expanding TRIPS-plus protection to so many countries.
C. Non Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations
A third and emerging party to these bilateral and multilateral negotiations are non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), which have increasingly been involved in challenging the TRIPS
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Agreement and various bilateral or multilateral agreements expanding TRIPS plus protections.38
With the NGOs’ political, or at least mass media, clout, less developed countries have become
capable of renegotiating supposedly settled treaties. For example, less developed countries,
acting in tandem with NGOs, were able to extract the Public Health Declaration during a new
round of WTO trade talks in Doha.39 This declaration applies to patented medicines, providing
less developed countries access to such pharmaceuticals by granting them a longer transitional
time before having to provide IPRs for such products.40 In addition to NGOs, there are
intergovernmental organizations, like the World Health Organization and the Food and
Agriculture Organization, which are becoming heavily involved in international negotiations
affected by intellectual property issues.41
This development has increased the number of forums available for different states or parties to
attempt to affect policy to maximize their respective interests.42 Moreover, the various
institutional structures, as they are designed, can provide a built-in bias in favor of developing
countries. For example, WIPO administers implementation of existing intellectual property
agreements and provides dispute settlement services, generating the revenue needed to fund its
activities.43 Moreover, WIPO’s staff provides technical assistance and training to member states
and their national intellectual property offices, the bulk of which is provided to developing
countries.44 To further meet these developing countries’ needs, and raise more revenue, WIPO
has expanded these services to include standing, expert, and intergovernmental committees that
carry out studies on particular intellectual property topics and generate soft law guidelines and
recommendations for consideration by WIPO member states.45 Thus, while WIPO is attempting
to provide services to facilitate the implementation of negotiated intellectual property
agreements, it also interacts most often with and directly impacts the policies of developing
countries. This likely creates some conflict of interest since the same organization, made up of
the same personnel, are greatly affecting various states’ policies and also adjudicating the

38
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validity of such policies in light of the various agreements they must follow.46 This may be
especially true in light of WIPO’s increasingly important role in influencing both TRIPS dispute
settlement and member states’ proposals to amend or supplement TRIPS.47 Consequently, it
would seem that these organizations would have, at the least, some slight bias towards the
developing countries with which they often interact.48
D. Negotiation Forum Selection
Ultimately, the decision to use a bilateral or multilateral forum can have a large strategic impact
on a country’s negotiations. Generally, a multilateral forum decreases a country’s control over
negotiations because it dilutes a country’s control. In fact, the number of countries involved and
their political influence are likely the most important factors to determine whether multilateral or
bilateral negotiations are the most strategically desirable forum.49 For example, large multilateral
forums can be very detrimental to developing countries if the developed countries (e.g. U.S.,
U.K., Canada, etc.) have similar tradeoffs and objectives to most proposals or topics while the
developing countries’ tradeoffs and objectives are more varied.50 In this type of setting,
46
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descriptive categories, several different coalition configurations emerged with some countries
ostensibly acting independently.);
Id. at 849 n.96
(For example, the Andean Group (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) and the Group of Ten
(Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia)
focused on different issues at different stages of the negotiations. The Group of Ten had early on
opposed the idea of TRIPS while the Andean Group was involved in making proposals at later
stages of negotiations.).
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developed countries can essentially implement a “divide and conquer” strategy, playing the
weaker factions off of each other to enhance their negotiating power more effectively and
substantially than they could in a bilateral forum.51 Moreover, a single country, or even a small
group can less afford the option of “walking away” from any deal when a multilateral forum
consists of a large portion of the world. Other countries involved in the negotiations are likely to
decide on standards that these countries will eventually have to accept to continue to be a viable
global trading partner.
E. IPR Negotiation Theories
There are generally three types of theories that attempt to explain the use of bilateral and
multilateral FTAs to expand IPRs: (1) U.S. or EU coercion of less powerful economic
countries52, (2) multinational corporation lobbying53, and (3) autonomous policy agreements,
which are made to maximize a constituency’s well being.54 The theories falling within the first
category essentially argue that an international hegemon can mostly impose and enforce its
desired rules and international policies upon weaker powers.55 As a result of the hegemon’s
power, it will usually act through independent decision making or through bilateral negotiation to
maximize the relational power disparity.56
The theories that fall under the second category, multinational corporate lobbying theories,
essentially argue that multinational corporations effectively lobby all parties, even resorting to
developing “false hopes,” which is a type of subterfuge, in order to obtain international policies
that favor their business interests.57 Thus, large multinational corporations, or entire industries
explicitly or implicitly collude to obtain beneficial policies.58 However, these entities usually
lobby all, or a substantial amount of, the parties of a negotiation to obtain the desired result.59
51
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The theories that fall under the third category, autonomous policy agreement theories, essentially
argue the all parties to a negotiation come to an agreement that best serves the public welfare of
their constituencies.60 Thus, the parties to a negotiation implement various negotiating tactics or
strategies to maximize their constituency’s well being.61 While special interests and NGOs may
play some role in the development of each party’s negotiation strategy, these theories suggest
that parties are sophisticated enough to determine what is actually in its constituency’s best
interests and act correspondingly.62
F.

Case Study – Testing Hypotheses

Keeping these three types of theories in mind, this paper will set out to test each one against real
world bilateral FTA negotiations. A case study comparing negotiations between the U.S. and
Chile with negotiations between the U.S. and Australia will be used to test the viability of these
theories.
In this case study Chile will be used to represent a less developed country negotiating with an
alleged hegemon, the U.S.63 Chile is used because it has recently signed an FTA with the U.S.
and because it is generally representative of most less developed countries. For example, Chile
relies on natural resources and agriculture for a majority of its exports and domestic economy.64
Further, Chile has only recently become a democracy, having been led by a military junta until
around 1990. 65
Australia, on the other hand, will be used to represent a developed country negotiating with a
more powerful, but relatively similarly sophisticated power, the U.S.66 Australia has a very

60
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61

Id.

62

Id.; One example of this type of theory would be that the American negotiators knowingly act to maximize IPRs
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http://www.ecee.org/pubs/assess/Chile/Chile.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (Chile’s Economy and Investment
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sophisticated economy, with services being its economy’s largest sector.67 Moreover, Australia
has been a very stable politically and economically, and has experienced great economic growth
over the past twenty years.68
III.

Chile

In this case study, Chile is an example of a less developed country. Chile should provide a good
model because it has only recently become a democracy after a fifteen year junta followed a
coup of the democratically elected socialist government. In large part, the junta occurred due to
mismanagement, massive corruption, and hyperinflation. Thus, Chile is a less developed country
essentially rebuilding its economic and political infrastructure, a situation likely to face any new
government established amid the current turmoil of many less developed countries (e.g. Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ukraine, etc.). Similarly, Chile is rich in agricultural (e.g. fruit) and
mineral resources (e.g. copper). This situation is similar to many other less developed countries
that are rich in natural resources.
Based on various theories presented by commentators, one could expect Chile’s bilateral FTA
with the U.S. to have resulted from various scenarios: it could be a result of the U.S. leveraging
its “hegemonic” power by attempting to coerce Chile into an FTA69, it could be Chile’s attempt
to further its economic policy by negotiating away IPRs for greater access to the U.S. market70,
or it could be the result of massive multinational corporations furthering their own economic
interests.71
In order to test these theories, a brief background of Chile’s recent history is necessary to
appreciate and understand the potential motivations and objectives that may have been
implicated in entering into an FTA with the U.S.
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Economist Intelligence Unit, Australia Economic Structure, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 24, 2004),
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Hope, 592 ANNALS 18, 20-21 (2004); see also Christopher T. Marsden, Cyberlaw and International Political
Economy: Towards Regulation of the Global Information Society, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. REV. 355, 400-04 (2001)
(LEXIS cites this journal as L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L.).
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A.

Democracy Produced by a Totalitarian Response to the Failures of Socialism

Chile has likely enjoyed the most political and economic stability of any country in South
America for the last 10-15 years. In fact, over the last six years it has experienced annual
inflation below 5% and realized an 8% annual GDP growth throughout the 1990s.72 In contrast,
it seems hard to believe Chile was a country in chaos around 1970.
Under the Frei government, the Chileanisation of major copper mines and an agrarian reform
allowed the Chilean government to expropriate any landholding of more than 80 hectares.73
These reforms included the nationalization of copper mines formerly controlled by American
investors.74 These socialist reforms were passed into law during the mid 1960s.75 They were
originally hailed as successful, and were expanded in the early 1970s.76 Moreover, most of the
banks and other important financial and manufacturing concerns were nationalized by 1972.77
Because these reforms were initially successful, the socialist political parties responsible for
them gained more support, instituted wage increases and froze prices in late 1971.78 The
expansion of such reforms ultimately led to skyrocketing inflation and massive governmental
budget problems.79 While the Chilean economy grew at around 7.7% in 1971, it also experienced
22% inflation.80 By 1972, due to expanded socialist economic reforms, inflation rose to 260%
and by 1973 inflation had risen even higher, to 600%.81 Ultimately, these conditions became
untenable, and similar to other countries that have experienced severe economic misfortune, a
military coup occurred, replacing the old, democratically elected socialist government with a
junta.82
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This junta, led by General Pinochet, eliminated the elected socialist government with the goal of
extirpating the communists out of Chile.83 Unfortunately, like other coups or violent uprisings,
this goal was taken to its extreme.84 Ultimately, Chile’s army was responsible for about 3,200
deaths or disappearances.85
By 1980, the Military began softening its control, allowing the creation of a Constitution.86 This
eventually led to elections in 1981 which, unsurprisingly, led to the election of General Pinochet
for an eight year term. 87
B. Economic Reforms Initiated by the Pinochet Regime
By 1973, Chilean inflation was over 600% and rising.88 The government debt accounted for 25%
of Chile’s GDP, which was likely to rise because the nationalized industries were losing about
$500 million a year.89 However, by Pinochet’s election, GDP had risen by 5% in three
consecutive years and inflation was down to 31%.90 The economic reforms that laid the
groundwork for Chile’s recovery was the result of a Point IV exchange program that sent
Chilean students to U.S. universities to receive higher degrees.91 Many of these students went to
the University of Chicago where they studied the monetarist theory of economics validated and
made famous by Milton Friedman.92 Some of these students held government posts and were
part, from the Versailles treaty. These conditions led to inflation rates that, at its worst, resulted in food prices
doubling or tripling in a matter of hours.
83
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promoted to administer the economy by the Pinochet junta by the middle of 1973.93
Consequently, these economists, known as the Chicago Boys, drastically cut government
spending, significantly dropped tariffs on foreign goods, and abolished price controls.94 For two
years, the economy suffered enormous setbacks, including substantial GDP loss, unemployment
increases, and high inflation.95
While these reforms were certainly difficult for a supermajority of Chileans, by 1980, they began
having a positive effect, resulting in high GDP growth and much lower inflation.96 By 1981,
inflation was down to 9.1%, GDP was growing at a 5.5% clip, the fiscal deficit had turned into a
surplus, and a real rise in salaries had seen consecutive years of substantial growth.97 Moreover,
the policy of promoting export-driven growth was beginning to produce impressive results.98
Natural resources like fruit, timber, and fishing products were being increasingly produced and
exported, diversifying Chile’s economy and reducing Chile’s reliance on its mining industries.99
As prosperity grew, profits and benefits did begin to “trickle down,” both in wages and in social
welfare as the policy focus began to shift to labor law development, education, justice, and other
social policies.100 These social reforms ultimately outlived the Pinochet government and have
served as models for many other Latin American countries.101
C. The Fall of Free Markets and the Demise of Pinochet
In 1982, oil prices skyrocketed and triggered, along with wild investment speculation, a massive
recession that caused Chile’s GDP to fall by over 14%.102 This crash decreased standards of
living and resulted in an outburst of street protests by many people in the lower and middle
classes.103 By 1984, Chile’s free market model was being reassessed from the positive influence
93
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high tariffs and export incentives had in creating a mild reflation.104 However, fears of a return to
the prior socialist system surfaced, and many of the free market policies instituted in the late
1970s were slowly reinstituted.105
At this time, the Pinochet government was fielding harsh criticism. Because of his regime’s
violent and autocratic tactics and Chile’s lack of progress toward democracy, U.S. policy turned
against Pinochet in 1984.106 In 1988, Chile held a plebiscite to determine if Pinochet and the
Chilean military would reign for another 8 years or whether Chile would implement democratic
elections. 107 Pinochet lost by nine percentage points.108
After elections were held in 1989, elected president Patricio Aylwin agreed with the opposition
parties to accept a free market economic system along the main lines of the economic policy
established during the military regime.109 By the end of the 1980s, Chile’ average per capita
income was about $2,000.110 The 1990s saw Chilean economic policies of encouraging free
markets result in high GDP growth while unemployment decreased.111 Six years after free
elections, Chile’s average pre capita income had risen by 250% to $4,740.112 Moreover, Chile
instituted government programs to enhance the “trickle down” effect of this economic growth,
decreasing the proportion of Chileans living in poverty from 40% to 24% by 1996.113 Chile’s
policies have been wildly successful, resulting in its per capita income doubling from $4,740 in
1996, to $9,140 in 2002.114
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Thus, in the last 30 years, which involved a coup and resulting junta that caused fifteen years of
highly volatile and oftentimes repressive policies, Chile has grown its economy and its citizens
have achieved the 16th highest GDP growth rate in the world.115 Moreover, it has been the only
Latin American country to achieve this growth in a steady, stable manner, while diversifying its
economy by expanding its manufacturing base.116
While Chile has a large portion of its population still living in poverty, there is little support for
government intervention to redistribute the rewards of its economic growth.117 Instead, Chilean
policies are focused on increasing economic efficiency, expanding access to markets, and
exploiting all of Chile’s comparative advantages to create the wealth needed to provide for
greater overall prosperity.118 Thus, to effectuate these policies, the last decade has seen Chile at
the forefront of negotiating FTAs of varying scope.
D. Chile’s International Policies and Negotiations
Since the early 1990’s Chile has pursued its trade objectives through a multidimensional trade
policy.119 This involved consolidating its unilateral policy of openness as well as negotiating
new bilateral free trade agreements, fine-tuning existing agreements, and actively participating in
regional and multilateral forums and negotiations.120
Having suffered for a long time from intermittent boycotts by the U.S. and a general reluctance
by Western countries to maintain more than formal relationships with Chile throughout the
Pinochet regime, Chile was interested in ensuring uninterrupted trade relationships.121 Thus,
Chile began negotiations to enter into various new regional and inter American agreements that
emerged at the end of the 1980s. 122 In 1990, President Bush stated that Chile would be the
United States’s first choice for inclusion in NAFTA.123 However, in spite of this policy
announcement and numerous promises from various U.S. delegations that included visits from
115
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various U.S. senators, the U.S. failed to incorporate Chile into NAFTA or negotiate a bilateral
agreement similar to NAFTA for fourteen years.124
Because Chile’s foreign trade is relatively evenly distributed between the U.S., Latin America,
the European Union, and Asia, Chile’s international focus was not limited to the U.S. market.
Thus, Chile expanded its search for other free trade or reduced tariff agreements with various
trading partners.125 For example, Chile entered into bilateral FTAs with Mexico in 1991,
Venezuela and Colombia in 1993, and Ecuador in 1994.126 Moreover, while negotiating these
bilateral trade agreements, Chile was involved in various multilateral negotiations, many of
which came to fruition by the mid 1990’s.127 In 1996, Chile became a formal associate member
to Mercosur, a free trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.128 Chile
also joined the APEC agreement, which consists of the U.S., Canada, and all the principal
countries of the Pacific Basin, and entered into an association agreement with the European
Union.129 While all this was being negotiated, Chile was also actively involved with the WTO,
with its primary focus on promoting further and more far reaching multilateral trade
agreements.130
From 1998-2002 Chile was able to negotiate even more FTAs, making pacts with South Korea,
Canada, and Central American countries.131 Moreover, Chile was able to move beyond its
association agreement by entering into a full FTA with the European Union.132 These agreements
led to these countries’ goods displacing American goods in the Chilean market.133 In fact, the
U.S. went from having a slight trade surplus with Chile to running a trade deficit as Chileans
substituted cheaper European goods for American goods.134 After two years of decreasing sales,
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Id. at 216.

125

Id. at 217.

126

World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Chile 1997, (Sept. 10, 1997), http://www.wto.org (last visited,
Feb. 21, 2005).

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 390-91 (2004); Chilean Government, Trade Policy
Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).

132

Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003) http://www.wto.org.

133

Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 399 & 401 (2004).

134

Id. at 401.

17

the U.S. reasserted its desire to negotiate an FTA.135 While the Americans had been slow to act
under the Bush and Clinton administrations of the 1990s, the economic losses it experienced
provided the necessary motivation and urgency for Chile to make an FTA it had coveted for over
ten years.136
The history of Chile’s economic and political development may provide a basis for analyzing
which hypothesis, or combination of hypotheses best explains Chile’s decision to enter into a
bilateral FTA with the U.S.
IV.

Australia

Australia is really the only developed country other than Canada to agree to some type of FTA
with the United States, and is the only one to do so in a bilateral forum. Moreover, Australia
provides a good comparison with Chile because both countries’ main exports to the U.S. are
mineral (e.g. gold, iron ore, coal) and agricultural (e.g. wool, wheat, beef) goods.137 However,
Australia has been more stable politically and has a much more developed economy, with
services and manufacturing making up much larger parts of its economy.138
Based on various theories presented by commentators, one could expect Australia’s bilateral
FTA with the U.S. to have resulted from various scenarios: it could be due to the U.S. leveraging
its “hegemonic” power by attempting to coerce Australia into an FTA,139 it could be Australia’s
attempt to further its economic policy by negotiating away IPRs for greater access to the U.S.
market,140 or it could be the result of massive multinational corporations furthering their own
economic interests.141
135
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In order to test these theories, a brief background of Australia’s economy and recent history is
discussed below to appreciate and understand the potential motivations and objectives that may
have been implicated in entering into an FTA with the U.S.
A. Traditionally Stable First World Economy
Australia’s economy traditionally has relied on natural resources, specifically wool and gold, to
achieve its political and economic success.142 In the 1890’s, Australia was a moderately
protectionist country with Free Traders and Protectionists compromising to achieve efficient
production and redistribution policies.143 Protectionists in Australia thought that tariff increase
could increase employment and redistribute income to the less wealthy.144 However, as mining
industries became a large portion of Australia’s income and a major source of its exports, this
attitude became less popular.145
Australia’s system of protection relied heavily on administratively allocated quotas that were
designed to protect items of mass consumption like textiles, footwear, and clothing.146 However,
this policy closed off opportunities for the expansion of Australia’s most productive industries,
which was necessary to increase wages, employment, and government services.147 For example,
the industries that received the major benefit from these quotas (textiles, clothing, and footwear)
experienced steep declines in domestic consumption during the 1970s.148 However, as these
industries were compared to less protected ones, their employment rates fell by a similar
proportion.149 Thus, in spite of the fact that protectionist measures redistributed income to the
protected industries in a much larger proportion, it yielded no improved result.150 Moreover, the
government subsidy was being used to artificially enhance goods that disproportionately and
detrimentally affected poor Australians’ purchasing power because these measures were applied
to necessities (clothing and footwear).151
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As it became more apparent that Australia’s protectionist measures and system were flawed,
disproportionately affecting the economic well being of the poor, Australia began to rethink its
economic and trade policies.152 As a result, Australia began liberalizing its trade policies in the
early 1980’s.153 This decreased Australia’s reliance on wool and mineral exports by raising
international competitiveness of all production of tradeable goods.154 While wool and mineral
exports expanded, manufacturing and services expanded even more.155 However, in spite of all
this diversification, wool and mining industries still represent the bulk of Australian exports.156
The net effect of Australia’s trade liberalization policy is that it suddenly made Australia a
credible participant in bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations in textile trade, which
would greatly affect its large wool industry.157 Thus, one of Australia’s primary objectives was to
advance textile trade liberalization in order to further increase its market access into the global
wool and textile markets.158
B. International Economic Policies
Australia’s trade liberalization has a large impact on its policy outlook. Australia is committed to
achieving free and open trade with all the developed Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
countries by 2010, and the less developed ones by 2020.159 Specifically, Australia is focused on
investment liberalization and expanding and encouraging business cooperation.160 Moreover,
Australia has sought to strengthen IPRs, but not copyright related IPRs.161
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Australia also has signed an FTA with New Zealand and, in addition to its objectives within
APEC, is looking to expand FTAs with other regional associations, particularly The Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).162
C. Decision to Enter Into an FTA with the U.S.
Australia also recently entered into an FTA with the U.S. Unlike Chile, there was extensive
internal debate as to whether entering into this FTA was in its best interests. The proponents of
entering into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. cited various reasons, some of which were similar to
Chile’s. For example, Australia wanted to increase its access to U.S. markets, increase American
foreign investment, and increase protections for its American investments. 163 Unlike Chile,
which lacks significant anti-globalization organizations or political parties, Australia has political
parties that are anti-globalization or anti-United States.164 Moreover, Australia has other
influential commentators that are against bilateral agreements because of their feared negative
impact on forming multilateral agreements.165 However, the political parties against an FTA with
the U.S. only made up about ten percent of Australia’s electorate.166
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example, it is claimed by some sources that drug prices will go up as a result of this FTA. Thus, while an FTA may
have a net positive impact on business, it could have a net negative impact on individuals or possibly just health
related sectors of Australian society/business (assuming prices do go up as a result of the FTA). Regardless, it seems
that most of these claims of a net negative economic impact are likely over exaggerated because both a vast major of
political parties and business leaders promoted the FTA.
166

ABC News Online, Election 2004 Results, http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004/results (last visited Nov.
28, 2004). Both the Labor (leading minority party) and Liberal (Prime Minister Howard’s party) parties in Australia

21

Thus, while there was more public debate in Australia, the supermajority of its electorate appear
to have come to a similar conclusion, which was: even if it had to strengthen IPRs, an FTA with
the U.S. was in its best interests.167
Australia’s economic development and history over the past few decades should provide some
insight into determining which hypothesis or hypotheses best explains Australia’s decision to
enter into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. These hypotheses are more extensively assessed below.
V. Summary of Findings
This part of the paper will analyze the results discovered in parts III and IV to assess each
country’s experience through the lens of each generalized theory: U.S. hegemony, multinational
corporate lobbying, and autonomous policy implementation. Additionally, this section will
project these findings into other areas of discourse. Specifically, it will discuss the ramifications
these results may have on determining whether a bilateral or multilateral forum is more equitable
for less developed countries negotiating with developed countries and whether NGOs should be
involved in IPR related negotiations.
A. Chile
Chile obviously was not coerced into an FTA with the United States. Instead, Chile had to
negotiate for over a decade and first enter an FTA with the EU before the United States would
agree to meaningful negotiations. In fact, were it not for the loss of market share U.S. goods
experienced as a result of Chile’s previously made agreement, it is possible the U.S. would have
continued to shun Chile, especially considering the potential political ramifications the
agreement could have made in the 2004 elections.168 Thus, Chile’s negotiating tactics show an
experience or sophistication that is capable of both balancing the interests of various partners,
and also negotiating with various other parties. Chile wasn’t just negotiating with the U.S during
this time. It was also and is also involved in numerous other organizations and bilateral
agreements, ranging from APEC to bilateral talks with various other countries like South Korea,
Canada, and other Latin American countries. If anything, the U.S. was coerced into an agreement
with Chile by Chile’s successful negotiation of an FTA with the EU, which arose, in part,
because the EU knew it would become much more competitive with American goods by
agreeing to such an FTA.169
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Thus, it appears that both a developed and less developed country have various tactics and
powers available to them in bilateral negotiations that aren’t inherently unfair or biased. In fact,
this case study suggests that less developed countries are just as capable and sophisticated
negotiators as developed countries. Specifically, Chile’s decision to engage in bilateral
negotiations actually provided it the necessary freedom to make an agreement with the U.S. A
multilateral setting would not have allowed Chile to play the U.S. against other large interest
groups like the EU, because the EU and the U.S. would have been much more likely to be
aligned against a less developed country like Chile.170 Moreover, because Chile has only been a
stable government for about 15 years, it is not necessarily true that a significantly long time
period is required to develop negotiation expertise.171
Chile, as a democracy, represents the will of the majority of its people in negotiating FTAs and
other international agreements. Because it views its trade liberalization policy as the main reason
for its quintupled per capita income over the last fifteen years, its decision to continue to further
this policy goal is unlikely due to outside coercion.172 Instead, it appears to reflect the apparent
success its policies have had and its populations desire to continue to expand these policies.
Specifically, agreeing to increased IPRs, when few, if any, significant Chilean interests are
exposed to potential problems in order to expand its competitiveness and market access to core
economic interest groups appears to be a well reasoned and politically justifiable action.173
Moreover, as history has indicated, it appears to be working and will provide the opportunity for
Chile to increasingly develop a manufacturing base and educational institution expertise.174 It
takes excess money to create institutions capable of improving education and environmental
goals, which provide educated work forces capable of more technologically sophisticated
production of goods related to pharmaceuticals, software, or electronics. 175 Moreover, Chilean
dependence on American foreign investment and its desire to increase or at least maintain this
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same level of investment is directly benefited from increasing various measures.176 Thus, Chile
appears to have given up very little in order to gain greater access to one fifth of the world’s
economic marketplace.
1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. hegemony
Based on the long period of time it took the U.S to enter into a bilateral FTA with Chile, it
appears unlikely the FTA resulted from any direct application of American hegemonic power. In
fact, because the U.S. only entered into meaningful negotiations after Chile successfully
negotiated an agreement with the EU, it seems that Chile used different negotiating tactics in
order to facilitate an FTA with the U.S, which had been one of its major policy goals since
1990.177
In fact, Chile has engaged in various forums to further its trade liberalization policies. From
entering Mercorsur, to bilateral FTAs with the EU, Mexico, Canada, and other countries, to
entering APEC, it appears unlikely this activity can be truly attributed to U.S. hegemonic power
or influence. Instead, it seems Chile actively seeks to implement its policies by promoting
agreements and effectuate occurrences it believes will increase its citizens’ well being.178 At the
very least, the Chilean government does not appear to feel it was coerced into the bilateral
agreement.179 As the Chilean government wrote in its most recent WTO report:
[The] Free Trade Agreement [with the U.S.] shows that a developing
country can reach a mutually satisfactory and comprehensive agreement
with a developed country, an agreement which does not merely focus on
market access, but also attaches importance to institutional matters that
contribute to transparency and improved conditions of competition which,
over time, will benefit all countries that trade with Chile.180
In view of the Chilean government’s understanding of its FTA negotiations with the
U.S. and the economic occurrences underlying the American negotiation and
agreement to the FTA, it does not appear that American hegemony or coercion played
any role in the negotiations.181
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ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
This theory appears to have more applicability than American hegemony. After all,
the Americans were not actively interested in negotiating an FTA with Chile until
after Chile had an FTA with the EU, which negatively affected American trade.182
Thus, while corporate lobbying over the FTA likely occurred in both countries, it
does not appear that there was any concerted effort to lobby or present some type of
“false hope” or misleading claim to either government. Instead, it seems that the
interested and affected corporations and other parties of each respective country
lobbied to further their inapposite corporate interests.
The one “hope,” or effective lobbying that could be attributable to some multinational
or large American corporation(s) is the FTA’s provision requiring capital market
reforms to create increased foreign investment in Chile.183 However, this appears to
have been something Chile recognized and has attempted to address using a variety of
policies.184 Moreover, the increased liberalization of Chile’s capital market actually
supports its policy of growing exports through the increased market access gained
through the FTA.185 Thus, it does not appear that Chile agreed to this provision as a
result of effective lobbying of some multinational corporation because medium sized
Chilean corporations were greatly affected by Chile's current capital market
regulatory structure. 186 Consequently, lobbying from affected corporate interests
within its constituency seems to be the most likely influence on Chile’s acceptance of
this provision, which is more akin to typical politics than geopolitical objectives
driven by large corporate interests.
iii. Chile’s Autonomous Policy Implementation
It appears that the most likely explanation for Chile’s decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with
the U.S. was to further its own interests. In light of Chile’s struggles in the 1970s and 80s, and its
belief that its free market and trade liberalization policies have been a major reason for its recent

182

Aaron Schavey, How Trade Promotion Authority Would Bolster the Manufacturing Industry, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER NO. 1561 (June 21, 2002),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1561.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
183

See Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
184

Evgenia V. Sorokina, Chile's Free Trade Agreements: Can Their Benefits Survive Chile's Continuing Controls
on Foreign Capital? 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1217, 1228-29 (2003).

185

Id.

186

Id. (“[T]he brunt of protection against capitales golondrina is borne by Chilean companies, and in particular, by
medium size companies that cannot raise cheaper capital to finance their operations and expansion.”).

25

economic success, its desire to enter into a trade liberalization agreement with the U.S. appears
consistent with this policy.187 In fact, it seems to further this policy.188
One can certainly argue that Chile’s economic policies are wrong or improperly developed, but
Chile has certainly found stability and amazing success compared to other countries, especially
in the past 15 years.189 Moreover, these policies are strongly supported by the country’s
populace.190
In fact, Chile’s decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. without really seeking to
diminish American agricultural subsidies, a problem that greatly affects Chileans’ large farming
industry, may even be a strategic negotiating decision. Currently, the FTAA has become bogged
down due to an impasse over American agricultural subsidies, strengthening of IPRs, and other
issues.191 Consequently, this FTA may be a decision by Chile to make more immediate and
certain gains in the American market with the current FTA. This allows Chile to continue to
address problems associated with American subsidies in the FTAA forum, where it may have
greater success due to the presence of Brazil and other Mercorsur countries which, are largely
responsible for the FTAA negotiation impasse.192 As these issues specifically relate to IPRs and
agrarian subsidies, it is Brazil and Argentina that have the most to lose in granting stronger IPRs
because both countries have relatively large generic pharmaceutical and agricultural
industries.193 In contrast, Chile does not have substantial industries relying on IPRs and does not
appear to be overly concerned with American farm subsidies, either because it is secretly hoping
for Brazil’s success in FTAA negotiations or because it is not overly concerned with the long
term effects of subsidies on Chilean products.194
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Consequently, it appears that Chile entered a bilateral FTA with the U.S. to further its own trade
policies. Moreover, it does not appear that Chile has much concern with any potential problems
stronger IPRs may present to its economic or technological development.195 This is likely due to
Chile’s economy not having any relatively substantial industries that rely on intellectual property
rights, like a pharmaceutical industry. Another explanation is that Chile hopes the FTA may
increase the rate of transfer and dissemination of various technologies, which would either offset
or be a net benefit when compared to any negative implications associated with granting stronger
IPRs.196 Since Chile relies on exports to fill most of its manufacturing and technological needs, it
is likely that technological transfer increases will increase its citizens well being without having
many negative affects to its industrial interests.197
B. Australia
As compared to Chile’s fifteen year FTA negotiation process, it appears the U.S. was much more
willing to negotiate with Australia. This seems surprising in light of many commentators’ claims
that developed countries are less willing to be coerced by the U.S, which is allegedly why the
U.S. does not entertain bilateral talks with many developed countries, specifically the EU.198 In
contrast, it took a relatively short time to make a similar pact with Australia. This may be due to
Australia having more accessible and experienced negotiators when talks were initiated, or it
may be due to artificial or inherent prejudices American policy has with countries that do not
share its Anglican heritage and language. However, as with Canada (but to a lesser extent),
Australia is dependent upon the American market for a large amount of its agriculture and gold
mining exports.199 Since these two industries are quite large, they obviously had a great impact
on the political decision to acquiesce in an FTA that provided greater IPRs.200 Moreover, such an
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agreement is consistent with recent Australian policies, which has focused on expanding its IPRs
over the last few years.201 This is probably particularly true when considering Australia’s small
entertainment and software industries.202 Moreover, because Australia has increasingly expanded
its manufacturing industries over the past 10-15 years, the increased market access provides an
avenue to create more and accelerating growth.203 Likewise, as with Chile, Australia relies
heavily on American foreign investment. Thus, as with Chile, Australia had much to gain and
little to lose in agreeing to expanding IPRs for greater foreign investment access.204
Australia was also concerned that less developed countries were becoming more competitive and
gaining greater access to American markets as a direct result of FTAs with the U.S.205 Thus, it
appears, at least in the case with Australia, that the less developed countries may be greatly
impacting developed countries’ decisions in making bilateral agreements.206
More importantly, as with Chile, Australia considers its trade liberalization policies of the last
15-20 years as being a major reason for its success in expanding its economy and growing its
manufacturing and other industries. Thus, its agreement also reflects its population’s decision to
continue implementing a policy that has been credited with greatly increasing its financial well
being. Moreover, to most Australians, greater IPRs are likely to provide a negligible problem
when compared to the positive impacts the FTA and stronger IPRs will have on Australia’s other
industries.207
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1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. Hegemony
It appears that U.S. negotiations with Australia went relatively smoothly. While Australia was
willing to agree to stronger IPRs, it also gained the greater access to U.S. markets and foreign
investment it desired. In lieu of the fact that Australia has relatively small IPR oriented
industries, it appears Australia sacrificed very little to achieve its objectives.208
In agreeing to an FTA with the U.S., it seems Australia was reacting to various factors.209 The
largest of these being increased competition in the American agricultural markets from FTAs the
U.S. had made or was planning to make with various Latin and Central American countries.210
Australia was also concerned with recent anti-free trade actions, like the tariffs placed on
American steel imports that did not come from countries the U.S. had some type of FTA with,
and Australia’s desire to further its trade liberalization policies.211
Thus, it seems there could be some support for a U.S. coercion hypothesis in relation to Australia
because of American anti-free trade tariffs and subsidies. However, the steel tariff was only
transitory in nature and repealed after a WTO ruling invalidated the tariff fifteen months after it
was created.212 Moreover, Australia was able to exempt its largest steel exporter, BHP Steel,
from most of these tariffs.213 Thus, while this may have been an Australian concern, it appears
that there were already avenues in place to deal with this issue and cannot adequately explain
Australia’s desire for an FTA.
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Moreover, Australia felt it had adequate negotiating power.214 This feeling seems to be validated
because business and political leaders seem, generally, very happy with the FTA.215
Consequently, it does not appear that Australia was really coerced into making this agreement.
Instead, it appears Australia was more interested in making the agreement to further its own
interests and maintain or increase U.S. attention in the Pacific region, which is another one of
Australia’s policies.216
ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
This theory appears to have much more applicability to the Australian-U.S. FTA than it did for
the Chilean-U.S. FTA. Some of the major proponents of this FTA were Alcoa, Kellogg’s,
Caterpillar, IBM, and Mobil.217 Moreover, mining, metals, and manufacturing are expected to
make the largest gains from the FTA for Australian industries.218 These results would clearly
help Alcoa and Caterpillar.
However, the FTA signed by Australia and the U.S. appear to help a vast array of Australian
business, especially agricultural interests, and its automotive industry.219 Consequently, it
appears that Australia attempted to help all of its industries in making the FTA, not just large
multinational corporations. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. was likely more willing to make
concessions that could help companies that also do have a substantial business presence in the
U.S. due to effective lobbying. However, the magnitude of this effect remains unclear.
Moreover, the fact that this agreement increased Australian financial investment into the U.S.
and will also help Australian firms of various sizes enter American markets indicates that the
agreement was not aimed solely at multinational corporate interests.220
Thus, while multinational corporate interests were involved in the FTA negotiation process, it
does not appear to have been the sole or even major aim of Australia in negotiating the
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agreement.221 Instead, it appears Australia was much more interested in promoting Australian
business interests, especially agricultural and mineral interests, which make up a large portion of
Australia’s economy and exports.222
iii. Australian Autonomous Policy Implementation
It appears that, while there is some evidence of U.S. coercion or multinational corporation
lobbying, the largest factor affecting Australian negotiations were indigenous Australian interests
in furthering its trade liberalization policies and economic opportunities for principally
Australian businesses.223 Australia is very committed to promoting economic policies that have
proven successful to growing Australia’s economy, which essentially consist of trade
liberalization policies.224 In fact, Australia is lowering its tariffs unilaterally through 2005 as part
of this robust policy.225
Additionally, Australia has been committed to expanding IPRs. 226 Consequently, Australia’s
decision to acquiesce to U.S. demands on expanding IPRs is consistent with this policy.
Additionally, strengthening IPRs is unlikely to negatively affect Australia’s overall economy.
Stronger IPRs will likely help Australia’s biotechnology industry, which is considered to be
“world class.”227 However, the greater rights are expected to negatively affect Australia’s
computer and technology industries.228 In spite of this negative impact, the FTA may have
221

Australian Industry Group, Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, at 2, (Feb. 7, 2004)
http://www.austa.net/pdf/AIGfeb04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)(explaining that agricultural, mineral, and
Australian automotive industry gains appear to be major winners from bilateral FTA negotiations. None of these
industries, with the exception of minerals, involves extensive multinational corporate involvement that would be
detrimental to Australian employment or business interests.).

222

Federal Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, Australian Farmers to Reap Benefits from an FTA,
(Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.maff.gov.au/releases/02/02321wt.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
223

Australian Industry Group, Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, at 2, (Feb. 7, 2004),
http://www.austa.net/pdf/AIGfeb04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).

224

Australian Government, Trade Policy Review Body: Australia, (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.wto.org (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Bruce Rasmussen, An Analysis of the Biomedical Sectors in Australia and Canada in a National Innovation
Systems Context, at 7 (July, 2004), http://www.cfses.com/pharma/documents/21Biomedical_Sect_Aust_&_Can_Innovation_Rasmussen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) compare with Australian
Trade Commission, Biotechnology Capability Overview, (Nov. 11, 2004),
http://www.austrade.gov.au/overseas/layout/0,,0_S3-1_-2_-3_PWB1108372-4_-5_-6_-7_,00.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2005) (explaining that Australia considers its Biotech industry, while relatively small, to be an “emerging” one.)
and Australian Trade Commission, Film Capability Overview, (Nov. 11, 2004),
http://www.austrade.gov.au/overseas/layout/0%2C%2C0_S3-1_3zo-2_-3_PWB1109329-4_-5_-6_-7_%2C00.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
228

Peter Higgs & Louise Van Rooyen, Australia’s Digital Content Future and the FTA The view from Australian
Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA),

31

created a sufficiently substantial net benefit to Australian commerce that it was willing to risk
negatively affecting this relatively small segment of Australia’s economy.229
C. Implications of These Results
1. Bilateral vs. Multilateral
It would appear that the success Chile had in its bilateral negotiations, especially when compared
to the highly unfavorable results attributable to the multilateral TRIPS negotiations, suggest that
the best forum for less developed countries are bilateral negotiations.230 This probably allows
each country to fully analyze the claims made by its trading partner and discern which are “false
hopes” and which are not. This is particularly true when the negotiators are highly capable,
which appears to be the case in some less developed countries like Chile or Brazil.231
It appears that a multilateral setting may not be necessary, and is likely even harmful to less
developed countries’ interests during any negotiation process. Thus, these countries are probably
better off using bilateral negotiations or negotiations between one developed country and a group
of less developed countries, similar to the FTAA negotiations.232 This would provide a less
overwhelming forum that is less likely to be coordinated by a vast array of powerful special
interests that are capable of separating any cohesion that may exist between the less developed
countries’ negotiation tactics or strategy.233
2. NGO Involvement
These results appear to impact some aspects of the current commentary regarding NGO
involvement in intergovernmental negotiations.234 Specifically, the notion that NGOs should be
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involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations would appear to make little sense if less
developed countries are capable negotiators that ably negotiate their population’s best interests.
Moreover, when dealing with democratically elected officials, it seems unnecessary to involve
parties that have no constituency or concrete interest in the results of the negotiations. If the
population doesn’t agree with its government’s policies, it votes for a change; this is particularly
true for bilateral negotiations, where each countries’ interested parties have the loudest voices in
whether policies or tradeoffs are acceptable.235 What positive influence NGOs could have in this
environment appear to be minimal, unless another barrier to finding mutually agreeable terms is
considered a positive influence on a negotiation process.236 Moreover, it is unlikely NGOs would
somehow be less corruptible than government officials, particularly because these groups lack
any connection to some elected constituency.237 Thus, even if NGOs are given a place at the
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(2004).
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negotiation table, lacking a constituency and clear accountability, it is uncertain that they will
have a positive influence.238
However, for autocratic or communist governments, such NGO involvement likely wouldn’t
present the same problems because these governments are less likely to be invoking policies
favorable to the majority of its population, or for the greater good. Instead, these governments
are more likely to be corrupt and more likely to benefit the empowered at the expense of their
populations.239 Thus, in these instances, NGOs, particularly NGOs that are focused on increasing
trap of those (NGO) people; they use the food as bait to get you to sex with them.") and Joseph Loconte, The U.N.
Sex Scandal, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 10, 2005,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/081zxelz.asp?pg=1 (last visited Feb. 21,
2005)
(The sexual abuses committed, or ignored, by U.N. personnel violate the institution's Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, and the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A
2002 U.N. report characterized the sexual exploitation issue as ‘a betrayal of trust as well as a
catastrophic failure of protection.’),
and Mark Steyn, U.N. Forces? Just a Bunch of Thugs, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 2005,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;sessionid=EWMD2C5GC5G1PQFIQMFSM5OAVCBQ0JVC?xml=
/opinion/2005/02/15/do1502.xml&sSheet=/opinion/2005/02/15/ixopinion.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
(All this derives from a UN culture in which the free nations have met the thug states so much
more than half way that they now largely share the dictators' view of their peoples - as either
helpless children who need every decision made for them, or a bunch of dupes whose national
wealth you can reroute to your Swiss bank account, or a never-ending source of fresh meat.),
with Secretary-General of United Nations Security Council Report, Children and Armed Conflict, (Sept. 7, 2001),
www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/KeyDocuments/Printable/Report/A-56-342-S-2001852English.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
(I sincerely hope that Member States, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations,
civil society and others will take decisive action to protect children and to actively dissuade, and
seek to expose and sanction, those whose actions are beyond the pale. This is a matter of
international cooperation and political will, and it is my hope that concrete commitments will be
made by the Security Council and Member States such that all parties to armed conflict, and actors
whose conduct indirectly fuels conflict, cannot but realize that the international community will
accept nothing less than full compliance with child protection obligations and commitments in
time of war and in its aftermath.).
238

See Gregory F. Jacob, Perspectives: Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 297 (2004)
(…NGOs exert tremendous influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right
on matters of substance, but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services
available to delegates with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly
did not act as disinterested legal advisers, and along the way more than one delegation was
hoodwinked into believing the NGOs' all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.);
cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 88 (2003)
([C]ountries need to consider the alternatives and, through democratic political processes, make
these choices for themselves. It should be – and it should have been-the task of the international
economic institutions to provide the countries the wherewithal to make these informed choices on
their own…The essence of freedom is the right to make a choice – and to accept the responsibility
that comes with it.).

239

See Pavol Stracansky, Corruption in Eastern Europe: Communism Leaves a Long Hangover, (Nov. 4, 2004),
http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/1625 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Peter Eigen, Corruption Perception Index
2004, (Oct. 20, 2004), http://www. transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.pe_statement_en.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2005) (“Corruption robs countries of their potential. As the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index

34

the financial well being and freedoms of the unrepresented, could provide a necessary voice that
is inherently present during negotiations between democratic countries in a bilateral setting, but
missing in negotiations with tyrannical or communist countries.240 Moreover, even if these
groups were corrupted or corruptible, it would be little different than what is already likely to be
the case with a communist or tyrannical government.241
VI.

Conclusion

As this case study illustrates, less developed countries are not as unsophisticated as many may
have claimed when negotiating FTAs that may provide for stronger IPRs. Instead, it appears that
the internal political capacity and stability of each country are the determinative factors of
whether a country is capable of adequately representing itself in such negotiations.242 Thus, the
willingness and likelihood of a less developed country with a democratic government entering an
FTA providing stronger IPRs is likely to be directly related to the substantial industrial interests
or constituency of each country.243
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